Following the 2007 disputed Kenyan Presidential election unprecedented levels of violence erupted across the country adding to the history of troubled elections in Africa. This paper offers quantitative and qualitative evidence on the incidence, impacts and issues that triggered electoral violence. Using two surveys conducted before and after the election we find that one out of three Kenyans were affected by the violence regardless of their ethnicity and wealth. The chances of being a victim of violence were higher in areas with land conflicts and where politicallyconnected gangs operated. Violence, which was mainly triggered by the perception that the election had been rigged, reduced trust and social capital among communities making violence more likely to reoccur. 
Since the 1990s many African autocracies have engaged in various efforts towards democratization, Kenya not being the exception. Support for democratization has primarily being used as an instrument to achieve accountability, install broadly legitimate governments and help in mediating disputes among the diverse ethnic groups. These institutional efforts are expected to improve economic performance and reduce proneness to political violence (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Carothers, 2007; Soudriette and Pilon, 2007) . However, with a few exceptions the recent record of African elections has raised concerns that in ethnically divided societies, competitive electoral processes could in fact be destabilizing by widening existing divisions and deepening divisions between winners and losers (Bardhan, 1997 judiciary and other institutions that can sustain democracy, but perhaps the main underlying cause is that no democratic means have been found to mediate the struggles over access to land and the resources controlled by the state (Bratton, 2008; De Smedt, 2009; Peters, 2009 ). Given these high stakes, politicians resort to a variety of means including vote buying, intimidation, electoral violence (Lindberg, 2003; Wilkinson, 2004; Schaffer, 2007; Vicente, 2007; Bratton, 2008 ) and other methods of manipulation such as the old trick of stuffing ballot boxes, tampering with vote tallies and ballot stealing (Throup and Hornsby, 1998 ).
The purpose of this article is to assess the incidence, impacts and the dynamics of the democracy, rule of law, among other issues. As the surveys were conducted right before the elections and some time after the elections they provide a unique opportunity to explore how political perceptions changed in the aftermath of the elections and how our respondents were affected by violence and other non-democratic practices. Information was also collected on the poverty at constituency level ahead of the elections and earlier.
As we follow our previous respondents of December 2007 over time rather than drawing a complete new sample of respondents we are able to analyze how electoral violence affected them. To complement the information on when and where electoral violence originated and how rapidly this evolved over time we also monitored the major media outlets across the country (local ratio stations, national newspapers and TV channels) on a daily and 24 hours basis from According to the self-reported incidence of violence in our surveys, violence affected one out of three Kenyans in terms of personal injury, being displaced from home, destruction of property, loss of jobs or earnings or having a friend or relatives that died in the elections. The likelihood of being a victim of violence was not affected by the respondent's ethnicity or wealth but by where respondents lived. Respondents living in urban areas and in areas which had suffered land disputes before the election had a higher likelihood of being victims of violence.
Violence was directly instigated by political actors and by politically connected gangs such as
Mungiki even before the elections. According to unsubstantiated reports in the media the police and politically connected gangs contributed to the majority of the killings observed during the post electoral violence (Ohito and Obonyo, 2010) . Nonetheless, the majority of respondents believe that violence was triggered mainly by the perception that the election had been rigged.
The ordeal of the disputed election reduced trust across ethnic groups, a key element of social capital among communities. International experience has shown that in situations where (ethnic) groups distrust each other and are afraid of being victimized, this fear might drive them to resort to violence first in a preemptive move to minimize damage (Bardhan, 1997) . Taking into account that having experienced conflict in the recent past is a good predictor for future conflict , Kenya is at risk of experiencing violence in the forthcoming 2012 general elections if institutions are not strengthened to cope with the underlying grievances, the need for justice and the mistrust among ethnic groups.
Although much of the electoral violence ended with the formation of the coalition government in Kenya, as it did in the recent case of Zimbabwe, coalition governments formed after disputed elections can set a misleading precedent to the future of democracy in Africa.
Coalition governments are not a substitute for democracy and as our survey in Kenya showed, it is ultimately not what people want (at least not at the time we conducted the survey, six months after the formation of the coalition government).
The article proceeds as follows: In the next section, we provide a brief summary of the Kenyan history towards democracy and the 2007 political campaign. Section three presents some highlights of the survey and media data, focusing on when and where violence occurred, how people were affected, who were the victims and what are the perceived triggers of violence.
Section four expands on this analysis by exploring in more detail the profile of victims of violence and how violence changed some of Kenyans' perceptions, based on multivariate analysis. The conclusions and discussion of the results are presented in section five.
Kenyan Elections
Kenya gained independence from Great Britain in 1963 and from then up until 2002 was ruled out by the political party Kenya African National Union (KANU). KANU's dominance was achieved by banning opposition parties in 1969 leaving Kenya a de facto one-party state to a de jure one-party state when a constitutional amendment in 1978 ruled that no other party was able to contest in the elections. In 1991 after much pressure from Kenyan activists and the international community multi-party elections were re-introduced. Several opposition parties emerged (FORD Kenya, FORD Asili, Democratic Party, Social Democratic Party, National Development Party of Kenya and other smaller parties). Nonetheless KANU remained in power winning the general elections of 1992 and 1997 amid violence and allegations of electoral irregularities. Much of the violence occurred during the pre-elections period and was concentrated in the Rift Valley and Western provinces and according to Kagwanja (2003) apparent local "Kalenjin warriors" attacked the homes and farms of migrant non-Kalenjin groups. The government described the violence as ethnically motivated clashes that erupted spontaneously as a result of multi-party politics. Analysts though, argued that politicians instigated the violence as a tool for winning the elections. People's need for land was exploited by some politicians to instigate violence, especially in the Rift Valley, as it has happened in other African troubled elections (Peters, 2009 ). Kagwanja (2001) argues that the Kalenjin and Maasai ethnic groups were allowed to occupy land abandoned by displaced groups to ensure the political alliance of these groups and to prevent them from joining opposition parties. The Kenyan elite aiming to suppress opposition political parties also recruited and sponsored 'tribal militias' and gangs for them to terrorize and instigate ethnic violence in the same vein as other African countries have done such as Cameroon, Malawi, Nigeria, South Africa and Sudan (Kagwanja, 2003) . Hence, contrary to the government's description of the violence as 'spontaneous ethnic clashes', the evidence suggests that much of the violence was in fact sponsored by the State whose actions did little to contain it (Human Rights Watch, 1993, p.1).
The Kenyan Human Rights Commission (2001) estimates that state-sponsored or statecondoned violence killed 4,000 people and displaced 600,000 others over the period 1991-2001.
Much of this violence was sponsored in the Rift Valley and in urban areas, especially in Nairobi where the opposition held sway since 1992 (Kagwanja, 2003) . The end result of this violence was the retribalization of politics and the erosion of civic nationhood (Kagwanja, 1998 (Kagwanja, , 2003 Throup and Hornsby, 1998 ).
In the general elections of 2002, all the opposition parties for the fist time united under the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) and behind a single presidential candidate, Mwai Kibaki. Kibaki won the presidential elections by defeating KANU's presidential candidate Uhuru Kenyatta. Mwai Kibaki's Presidential election success in 2002 -declared free, fair and the most peaceful elections that Kenya has had in recent years by international observers-was hailed at the time as a step forward for Kenyan democracy. The democratic achievement was much owed for having formed a multi-tribal NARC coalition, unlike the previous multi-party elections where political parties formed seeking to target a specific ethnic group (Oyugi, 1997) . It also helped that the two presidential candidates (of the NARC and KANU parties) were from the same ethnic group (Kikuyu). In that the election focused on which party would bring the most prosperity to the country forgetting tribalistic agendas.
Kibaki came to power promising to turn the economy around, to introduce free primary education, to deliver a new constitution within 100 days of his presidency and to end corruption and tribalism. President Kibaki's administration delivered to Kenya a booming tourism industry, economic growth increased from a rate of close to zero to more than 6% annually and free primary school education was introduced. Less progress was achieved in tackling corruption, widespread poverty, simmering ethnic/land tensions and in delivering a reformed constitution. 
Monitoring 2007 Political Campaign
To assess the nature of electoral campaigning and violence we requested the Steadman Group, a private company with the most experience in monitoring media in Kenya, to track political advertising, political campaigning as well as incidents of electoral violence across the country. The political campaigning centered around the politicians' track record, trust, promised policies but also on tribalism. In contrast to the 2002 election, the 2007 elections were characterized by political parties pursuing sectarian agendas and accusing each other of using ethnicity for political purposes. For instance, Odinga's political manifest argued "Ethnicity is a national disease knowing no regional boundaries and not confined to any one community. It rules our national politics and divides us unnecessarily. The Kibaki Government has compounded the ethnicity factor and deepened ethnicity in our public service by appointing people from his own community. Thus the reorganization of the Government was dictated by prejudice and not equity…The Kibaki government's kazi iendelee means let the status quo prevail -public jobs for the few and not the many." (ODM 2007, p. 16 ).
Pre-Electoral Violence Reported in the Media
To assess how peaceful the political campaigning was we reviewed all incidents of electoral violence reported in the twelve media outlets monitored (local ratio stations, newspapers and TV 1 While CTV, Ramogi FM, Mulembe and Citizen Radio are affiliated to the same media house (Royal Media), and KBC radio and KBC TV belong to the state broadcaster, reports were cross checked to avoid repetition of incidents while logging the reports.
violence to aspirants and party supporters, distribution of hate campaigns via leaflets and SMS that sought to incite violent prejudice against members of rival parties and direct violence on candidates and supporters including reported killings. Campaign-related ethnic violence was also reported in the Rift Valley as ethnic groups clashed within Molo, a district that reports cases of ethnic violence every election year as political rivalry and aggression is transferred to land ownership issues.
Forty one people died as a result of pre-electoral violence in December. According to the media (and police reports) 25 of these deaths took place during campaign rallies, the highest death toll caused by campaign rallies in Kenya. Since the great majority of deaths (25) 
Electoral Irregularities: Pre-and Post-Electoral Surveys
Two weeks ahead of the elections we conducted a detailed survey of voter intentions, attitudes towards violence, socio-economic characteristics of Kenyans among other issues. The data are based on a nationally and regionally representative sample of 1,207 Kenyans aged 18 and over who were interviewed in 76 out of the 210 constituencies with a margin of sampling error of +/-3% at a 95% confidence level. The sample captures the rural/urban split consistent with the most recent Kenyan census that shows that 65% of respondents live in rural areas and the remainder in urban areas. The ethnic distribution of the sample respondents also matches that of the national population. We conducted a second survey in August 2008, revisiting previous respondents to find out about their experiences in the aftermath of the election, their expectations from the new coalition government and whether their views had changed regarding trust among Kenyans, democracy, land conflict, among other issues. We managed to re-interview 60% of our previous respondents. 2 At the time of our pre-election survey, most respondents (98%) claimed that they would cast their vote in the following general elections. The two main presidential candidates, the then incumbent president Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga were in a close race with 39.1% of respondents intending to vote for Kibaki and 46.6% for Odinga. Classifying voter preferences for a presidential candidate and voters' ethnic group shows that there is unison in the voting patterns
In order for our post-electoral survey to be comparable to our previous survey we replaced respondents that could not be found for new ones that had the same gender, education (defined as completed primary or less, or more than completed primary) and living in the same constituency as the respondent replaced. In addition if the respondent that could not be tracked back was a Meru, Kikuyu, Luo or Luhya the respondent was replaced with a person of the same ethnicity, gender, education who lived in the same constituency. We replaced respondents with new ones living in the same constituency, as our extensive pilot work in the worst areas affected by violence (Rift Valley, Nyanza and Nairobi) suggested that the great majority of displaced people moved within the same constituency to areas where they had relatives or to neighborhoods where there were more clusters of people from their ethnicity. Respondents of Meru, Kikuyu, Luo or Luhya that could not be tracked were replaced with respondents of the same tribe as our pilot work suggested that these were the ethnic groups worst affected by violence and above all by displacement. The main characteristics of both surveys respondents are listed in Table (1). among most ethnic groups. The three main presidential candidates, Kibaki (of Kikuyu ethnicity), Odinga (of Luo ethnicity) and Kalonzo (of Kamba ethnicity) were overwhelmingly supported by the people from their own ethnic groups (as shown in Table 2 ). Other ethnic groups that did not have a major presidential candidate contending in the election seem to have voted for one of the candidates in a block: The Luhyas and Kalenjins primarily supported Odinga, while the Merus and Embus supported Kibaki. Given the close proximity in the voter's intentions any of these two candidates could have won depending on voter turnout.
Who won the presidential elections?
The elections were held on the 27 December 2007. Kenyans went to the polls in record numbers, some waited for hours in lines that were miles long (Gettleman, 2007) . A day after the election, the first batch of results showed Raila Odinga with a clear advantage in the presidential race, leading by more than one million votes. The ODM declared victory for Raila Odinga on 29
December but as more results were announced on the same day, the lead that Odinga had shrunk to only 38,000 votes with 90% of the votes counted. Against the predictions of opinion polls and the early counts of the votes, the Election Commission of Kenya found Mwai Kibaki the winner of the presidential election on 30 December, placing him ahead of Odinga by 232,000 votes. That is with 51.3% of the votes to Kibaki and 48.7% for Odinga and with a 69% of voter turnout.
Following the disputed Electoral Commission's declaration, Kibaki was right away sworn in for his second term. Cries and doubts for a stolen election were immediately shared by the ODM party and international electoral observers.
The ODM party pointed out that a sign of fraud was the fact that the MPs contending for the ODM (the party supporting Raila Odinga) had won 99 seats versus the 43 seats won by the MPs of the PNU (the party supporting Mwai Kibaki) in the general elections. Although one could argue that people voted strategically for Mwai Kibaki (the PNU party) for the presidency and for MPs backed by the ODM, our survey shows no sign of such strategic voting. The majority of those who claimed would vote for Raila Odinga for president also claimed that they would vote for MPs contending for the ODM (94%). Similarly those who claimed that they would vote for Mwai Kibaki supported MPs running for the PNU (92%).
On 2 January 2009 Samuel Kivuitu, the Chairman of the Electoral Commission, admitted "I do not know whether Kibaki won the election" (Ongiri, 2008) . Kivuitu also revealed that he was put under pressure by "some PNU and ODM-Kenya leaders" by calling him frequently and asking to announce the results immediately. 3 With the information available in our surveys it is impossible to dwell on the irregularities mentioned by the opposition or electoral observers. But as shown in Table ( 2) both our pre-and post-electoral surveys suggest that Raila Odinga was the favorite to win among the electorate, more evidently so in the post-election survey.
Kivuitu agreed to take the presidential election winner's certificate to the State House after "some people threatened to collect it…". To Kivuitu's surprise "the Chief Justice was already there ready to swear-in Kibaki". Kivuitu agreed to announce the results because the Electoral Commission had no legal mandate to investigate complaints raised by the opposition immediately. It was a matter for the courts to investigate the irregularities.
When and where electoral violence spread?
Within hours of the announcement that Mwai Kibaki won the presidential election violence spread across much of the country. However, not all violence erupted 'spontaneously'. Our preelectoral survey shows evidence of ethnic and politically instigated violence even before the elections. Roughly 30% of respondents claimed that 'Political representatives openly advocated violence in their communities before the election'. This figure remained practically unchanged after the elections. Gangs connected with politics were frequently mentioned too. Before the elections 20% of respondents reported that they had heard frequently about gangs connected with politics in their community. This figure went up to 31% after the election. Similarly 20% reported having heard frequently of ethnic violence in their community before the elections, and this figure went up to 35% after the elections.
Also there were plenty of irregularities before the elections such as vote-buying, having suffered intimidation from members of political parties and land disputes. Specifically, one out of two respondents experienced attempted vote buying and almost one out of six experienced intimidation. Five percent of respondents "Had land disputes over the year ahead of the election" and similarly 5.3% accepted to be "Settled in an irregular land scheme". Before the elections there was widespread fear that violence would erupt, roughly 50% of respondents were afraid that electoral violence would spread to their constituency before the elections, and this figure went up to 58% after the elections.
According to the media reports, after the elections and especially once the results were announced, the opposition party supporters went on an unprecedented level of 'orgy of violence' which lead to counter attacks and 'revenge killings' (Otieno, Apart from the obvious impact that the Kenyan political crisis had on the macro-economic level, the crises had consequences at the micro-level. Here we explore the extent to which, Kenyans, were affected on the ground. To explore whether our survey respondents were affected by the outbreaks of electoral violence we asked "Were you personally affected in the outbreaks of violence after 2007 in any of the following ways?" Twenty-nine percent of respondents reported a specific personal impact after the elections, that is in terms of personal injury, being displaced from home, destruction of property, loss of jobs or earnings or having a friend or relatives that died in the elections. Figure (1) shows that about 3% of respondents claimed that their houses were destroyed in the outbreaks of violence and 7% of respondents claimed that their houses were damaged. 5 More than 80% of Uganda's imports pass through the port of Mombasa, as do almost all of Rwanda's exports. According to the Uganda Manufacturers Association manufacturers had lost $43 USD million because of the delays, destruction of goods and slowed production caused by the Kenyan crisis (Kimani, 2008) .
A further question asking directly whether the respondent had a family member that died because of the electoral violence revealed that 4.6% of respondents had suffered from this event.
This figure needs to be interpreted carefully as our respondents might have understood the definition of "family member killed" in a loose term, such as having close friends or having heard of someone in their community being killed. 
Consequences of violence
The events that followed the general elections of 2007 might have affected political behavior and many of Kenyan's views such as support for democracy. Perhaps surprisingly we found that in both surveys the majority of respondents (70%) reported democracy as the most preferable type of government. However, the perception that Kenya is a full democracy changed. In December 2007, 20% of respondents believed that Kenya was a fully democratic country. That perception is now shared by only 6%. The majority of people (86%) still believe that Kenya is a democratic country, although with problems.
To elaborate on Kenyan's view on democracy respondents were asked about their trust in elections. There is a statistically significant increase from 10% to 26% of respondents preferring other methods for choosing leaders. In other words, Kenyans have faith in democracy, but not in According to the post-electoral survey, 33% of respondents claimed that the extent to which they "Do business with people from other ethnic groups had worsened since the elections".
International experience has shown that when groups distrust each other and are afraid of being victimized, this fear might drive them to resort to violence first in a preemptive move to minimize damage (Bardhan, 1997) . This might explain for the animosity towards violence observed after the disputed elections. In December 2007, 12% of respondents answered that it is "Sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause", this figure went up to 21% by August 2008. In other words today, one in four Kenyans say that violence is justified. The survey also shows that Kenyans are divided on whether amnesty should be given to those who were involved in the outbreaks of violence. Roughly 43% of respondents disagree with granting amnesty, whilst 45% agree amnesty should be given.
Econometric Analysis: Profile of victims of violence
In this section we assess which are the main individual and local variables which increased the (Fearon and Laitin, 2003) , some studies have found that typically ethnically mixed societies are more likely to engage into conflict (Gurr, 2000) . The history of elections in Kenya has shown that politicians have tapped into people's ethnic differences with the purpose of dividing the electorate and conquering political rents. So it is of interest to assess whether 'this divide and conquer policy' increases the chances of being victim of violence in relatively low or high ethnically mixed communities.
To assess the profile of victims of violence we use the probit model shown in equation (1) group and increases in value the more ethnically diverse the population is in the district. In our sample, the majority of districts sampled had respondents belonging to more than one ethnic group (74 out of 77) so the ELF index ranges from zero to 0.8. Table ( Respondent's wealth level was not a contributing factor for being affected by violence.
We assessed a respondent's wealth level by constructing a wealth-asset index based on the responses to "from the following list which of these things does your household own?". The list of things includes 15 possible durable assets 6 6 Question includes: book, radio, television, bicycle, motor vehicle, house, oven, fridge, washing machine, land telephone, land, cattle, and in the question referring to respondent's wealth computer and mobile phones were added. The answers were recorded as either no, yes, or don't know.
, which we used to construct a normalized wealthasset index ranging from 0 (respondent not owing assets at all) to 1 (owning all 15 listed assets). Table ( 3) shows that the probability of being a victim of electoral violence was not statistically significantly affected by wealth. We also used the poverty level where the respondent lived (at In fact, the marginal effect was close to zero and not statistically in all models shown in Table (3) therefore not presented. This evidence fails to support our third hypothesis that poverty in Kenya was one of the factors that contributed to the electoral violence.
In terms of ethnicity, we find that those of Meru and Kamba origin were less likely to be victims of violence than those of Kikuyu origin (the base group), but no statistical difference in whether a Luo or Kikuyu, the two main opposing ethnicities, were affected. Respondents living in the Central and Eastern provinces were less likely to be victims of violence than those living in Nairobi before the 2007 elections. We find no significant evidence to suggest that the degree of ethnic fragmentation in the area where respondents lived affected the likelihood of being a victim of electoral violence.
We move on to explore the factors that influenced the probability of specifically being physically attacked or injured. To assess this issue we run a second probit model using as a dependent variable whether the respondent "Had been physically attacked or injured because of electoral violence." The results shown in Table ( In a third probit model we explore the factors that influenced the probability of suffering a loss in income or assets "because of failed household business (non-agricultural) as a consequence of electoral violence". The results shown in Table ( forced to leave home, damage to personal property, loss of a job, destruction/closure of business, loss of earning from business, friends or relatives died). We also control for the province where the respondent lived right before the elections P i , and the degree of ethnic diversity in the area where the respondent lived right before the elections ETHNIC i . We do not control for whether respondent had land disputes or heard of gangs operating in area as these variables are correlated with the probability of being victim of violence.
In Table ( 3) under column (4) it is shown that the probability of thinking that amnesty should be given is not affected by whether the respondent was a victim in the outbreak of 
Impact on Social Capital
Here we focus more closely on assessing some of the consequences of the disputed election on how people relate to each other. For this purpose we run a probit regression using as a dependent As shown in Table ( 3) under column (5) shows that trust for people of other ethnic group was not affected by respondent's wealth level or whether respondent was living in an urban setting. However, having being victim of post-electoral violence increased the probability of not trusting people of other ethnic groups by 7%. Luhya, Kamba, Meru, Kissi, Kalenjin and Mijikenda are less likely to report that their trust for people of other ethnic group got worse compared to the Kikuyu (the reference group).
In column (6) we instead focus on the factors the probability that respondents answered "Since the elections of 2007 the respondent's trust has worsened for people of his/her ethnic group". We find no evidence that having being victim of violence affected the probability of distrusting people of same ethnic group.
To conclude or econometric analysis we estimate a probit model using as a dependent variable whether respondents answered "The extent to which they do business with people from a different tribe to his/hers has deteriorated since the elections". The results of this model, presented in (7), show that the probability of a respondent doing less business with people of other tribes was not affected by respondent's ethnicity (with the exception of the Somalies), by whether respondent was affected by violence or living in urban setting.
Conclusions
The objective of this article was to investigate of the triggers of the Kenyan electoral violence, its characteristics and consequences. We showed that before the elections there were widespread Kenya will have to act now or face the consequences, especially so considering that an international predictor of civil conflict is having had a conflict in the past. Because of Kenya's crucial economic role in the East African region, the efforts of preventing a new crisis is no longer reduced to preventing the socio-economic devastation solely of Kenya but beyond her borders. 
